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ARTICLES
THE BIRTH OF PRIVACY LAW: A CENTURY
SINCE WARREN AND BRANDEIS
Irwin R. Kramer*
It was not a constitutional amendment, but it gave rise to certain constitu-
tional rights. Nor was it a broad statutory scheme, but it gave rise to numer-
ous statutes nationwide. In fact, it was not even embodied in case law, but it
gave rise to a long line of cases that have formed the foundation of one of the
most intriguing fields of law ever invented. The field is privacy law; the
"inventors" were two young lawyers named Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis; and "it" was a law review article penned by both men one full
century ago.
In The Right to Privacy,1 an article hailed as "perhaps the most influential
law journal piece ever published," 2 Warren and Brandeis vented their frus-
tration with the intrusions into individual privacy by nineteenth century
journalists armed with the latest technological innovations. With a firm
command of English precedents and masterful logic, these commentators
urged courts to combat this threat to individual privacy by adding a broad
new right to the common law - the "right to be let alone" or "right to
privacy."3 While courts had not previously given individuals such protec-
tion, and many jurists hesitated to accept these revolutionary views,4 numer-
ous courts adopted Warren and Brandeis' reasoning and heeded their call for
* Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland. 1990-91 Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and
Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago School of Law. B.A., 1984, Towson State Univer-
sity; J.D., 1987, University of Maryland; LL.M., 1989, Columbia University. Copyright ©
1990 by Irwin R. Kramer.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rv. 193 (1890).
2. P. DIONISOPOULOS & C. DUCAT, THE RIoT TO PRIVACY 20 (1976).
3. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
4. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 539, 64 N.E. 442, 443
(1902) (expressing fear that adoption of Warren and Brandeis' proposals will result in absurd
and illogical litigation). The New York Legislature overturned this case by statute. See, e.g.,
Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981) (citing N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs
LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976)) (finding a model's privacy violated through unauthorized use of
her photograph on posters).
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expanded common law rights.5 One hundred years later, the right to pri-
vacy is firmly ingrained in the common law of most states and occupies a
prominent place in American society and jurisprudence.6
With the rise of privacy law, the article that gave birth to it has also
earned a prominent place in American legal literature and history. Even
critics of Warren and Brandeis readily admit that The Right to Privacy may
be the "most influential law review article of all,",7 and many prominent
commentators credit the article as having done "nothing less than add a
chapter to our law."' To this day, Warren and Brandeis' article is con-
stantly referred to as "the best example of the influence of law journals on
the development of the law,"9 and courts still cite it as an authoritative
source. 10
This Article, the latest in a series of scholarly manuscripts inspired by
Warren and Brandeis, reviews the state of the law before they published
their landmark article, " the manner in which they plotted to change this
law, 2 and the impact of their efforts in creating a field of law that continues
to occupy courts and commentators with the same degree of vitality that
existed when their article was first published in 1890. " While this remarka-
ble success has not gone uncriticized, and certain commentators believe that
the time has come to abandon Warren and Brandeis' views, 4 the right to
5. The first major court to adopt Warren and Brandeis' views was the Supreme Court of
Georgia. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); see also
Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899) (acknowledging the
right to privacy without applying it); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895)
(finding that the unauthorized use of a portrait of a deceased woman did not violate a right to
privacy).
6. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
7. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law---Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
8. Statement of Roscoe Pound to William Chilton in 1916, quoted in A. MASON, BRAN-
DEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law and the Constitution: Is
Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TExc L. REv. 611, 612
(1968) (discussing "that unique law review article which launched a tort"); see also Adams,
The Right of Privacy, and its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REv. 37, 37 (1905)
(touting the article as "one of the most brilliant excursions in the field of theoretical
jurisprudence").
9. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 162 (3d ed. 1978).
10. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 & n.16 (1975) (article
has provided "powerful arguments" for a right to privacy); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
380 (1967) ("celebrated article" has provided theoretical basis for privacy statutes).
11. See infra notes 15-38 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 39-81 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 82-118 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
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privacy may forever remain one of society's most valued individual
protections.
I. PRIVACY PROTECTION BEFORE WARREN AND BRANDEIS
Although the law did provide some protection for privacy before Warren
and Brandeis wrote their famous article, the protection consisted of limited
legal theories whose shortcomings outweighed their usefulness. Rather than
protecting individuals through legal doctrine specifically designed to safe-
guard their privacy interests, nineteenth century American courts and legis-
latures provided remedies for only a limited number of intrusions and left
individuals with incomplete and inadequate protection.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provided one
such remedy. On the time-honored notion that "a man's house is his castle,"
the states added the fourth amendment in 1791 to preserve the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."' 5 While
the United States Supreme Court touted this right as safeguarding "the sanc-
tity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"' 6 this provision actually pro-
tected very few privacies. Far from establishing a constitutional right to
privacy, the fourth amendment only prevented government officials from un-
lawfully intruding into the home or personal property, leaving private citi-
zens free to invade the privacies of life at will. 17 Consequently, the fourth
amendment applied only to a small percentage of privacy invasions and did
not secure an individual's "right to be let alone."
To remedy those invasions committed by private citizens, the best relief
that nineteenth century courts could offer was an action for trespass.' 8
Although courts occasionally used this remedy to provide individuals with a
15. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. One commentator has written that the fourth amendment
"is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events which
immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle with England." J. LANDYNSKY, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
19 (1966).
16. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (upholding a state statute requiring
production of evidence after service of notice on the basis that the Constitution forbids only
unreasonable searches and seizures). Interpreting a parallel provision adopted by the State of
Michigan, Judge Thomas Cooley, a leading constitutional scholar during Warren and Bran-
deis' time, viewed this right as "mak[ing] sacred the privacy of the citizen's dwelling and
person." Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 208 (1874).
17. "[T]he Bill of Rights by its terms and necessary implications has been viewed only to
limit the freedom of the government when dealing with individuals." NOWAK, ROTUNDA &
YOUNG, CONsnTrTIONAL LAW § 12.1(a), at 421 (1986).
18. See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1892, 1895 (1981).
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"right of quiet occupancy and privacy"' 19 and purportedly to compensate
plaintiffs for "injury, insult, [and] invasion of the privacy,"'2 the require-
ment that plaintiffs prove a physical intrusion upon their real property se-
verely limited this remedy's usefulness.2 For nonphysical intrusions, such
as eavesdropping, only criminal sanctions were available. Under both the
common law 22 and state statutes,23 persons could face criminal prosecution
for invading another's privacy without physically intruding upon the home.
Nonetheless, prosecutors rarely sought indictments for eavesdropping and
turned their attention instead to more heinous and violent crimes.24 For this
reason, the criminal law provided only a theoretical check on invasions of
privacy which, in practice, left most individuals without any protection
against such intrusions.
To rectify the lack of effective legal remedies, courts occasionally tried to
compensate plaintiffs by taking existing legal doctrine to extremes. Perhaps
recognizing the inadequacy of traditional trespass actions in addressing inva-
sions of privacy, the New York Court of Appeals expanded the scope of this
remedy and awarded damages to a plaintiff even though the defendant did
not physically intrude upon the plaintiff's property.25 In Moore v. New York
Elevated R.R. Co.,26 the plaintiff sued the defendant railroad company for
erecting a train platform overlooking his home and property. While this
platform did not physically trespass upon the plaintiff's property, the court
observed that the defendant's patrons and employees "interfered with the
privacy of the [plaintiff's] rooms, by looking in when standing on the plat-
form and when coming down the stairs along the building."27 Ignoring the
19. Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 591 (1880) (permitting a house guest to recover
against her host for an unwelcome intrusion into the bedroom that her host had provided for
her).
20. Ives v. Humphrey, 1 E.D. Smith 196, 201-02 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1851) (emphasis
omitted).
21. "Unless it is with the possessor's permission or is excused as privileged, any knowing
entry upon the possessor's land is wrongful: it is a trespass." R. CUNNINGHAM, W.
STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.1, at 411 (1984).
22. Sir William Blackstone described the English common law crime of eavesdropping as
"listen[ing] under walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 168 (Tucker ed. 1803).
23. See Note, supra note 18, at 1896 & n.34 (citing, inter alia, N.Y. PENAL CODE § 436
(1881)); Grand Rapids v. Williams, 122 Mich. 247, 250, 70 N.W. 547, 547-48 (1897) (punish-
ing a "peeping Tom" for violating an ordinance prohibiting "indecent, insulting, or immoral
conduct").
24. Note, supra note 18, at 1896 (criminal indictments were "never numerous").
25. Moore v. New York Elevated R.R. Co., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 528, 29 N.E. at 998.
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fundamental elements of a trespass action, the court simply stated that "[n]o
reason appears why the defendants [sic] should not be responsible for the
consequences of the loss of privacy thus occasioned so far as it depreciated
the rental value of the rooms in the plaintiff's building."2 Accordingly, the
court permitted the plaintiff to maintain an action for this depreciation. Yet,
because the court proceeded on a trespass theory of recovery, it did not ad-
dress the availability of damages for the emotional distress occasioned by the
loss of privacy and, thus, was not able to fully compensate the plaintiff for
the privacy invasion.29 Consequently, the extension of trespass remedies to
invasions of privacy did not solve the problems of aggrieved plaintiffs.
In another noteworthy attempt to expand existing legal doctrine to com-
pensate for the lack of effective remedies, courts frequently stretched libel
law to redress the privacy invasions of an overzealous press. Prior to the
adoption of the Warren and Brandeis proposal, individuals subject to disclo-
sures of true, but offensive, private facts had no cause of action available. To
fill this gap in the law with libel remedies, nineteenth century courts strained
to overcome a very significant obstacle: Under libel law, the truth of a re-
port, no matter how offensive it may be, is an absolute defense.3 0 Courts,
wishing to redress privacy invasions, often frustrated this defense by requir-
ing that reporters print the "whole truth" with uncompromising precision."'
If a publication contained even the slightest inaccuracy, plaintiffs could re-
cover damages for emotional distress and for reputational injury.32 Thus, as
long as a newspaper story contained some inaccuracies or omissions, nine-
teenth century courts relied on these flaws as a pretext to redress invasions of
privacy.
Although this tactic provided some compensation to aggrieved individu-
als, this questionable solution was far from ideal. In addition to distorting
libel law beyond recognition, libel suits proved to be an unsatisfactory means
of redressing privacy invasions. In practice, libel actions only exacerbated
the plaintiff's injury through highly publicized trials that focused upon the
truth or falsity of a damaging disclosure.33 Furthermore, those courts that
28. Id
29. Id
30. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 796-97 (4th ed. 1971).
31. See, e.g., McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 76 Mich. 338, 354, 43 N.W. 431, 437
(1889) (reversing a directed verdict for the defendant who published a report of the plaintiff's
arrest, but failed to report the subsequent withdrawal of charges); Sharpe v. Stephenson, 34
N.C. (12 Ired.) 348, 350 (1851) (ruling against a defendant whose report of adultery erred as to
the time and place in which the act was committed).
32. Adams v. Smith, 58 Ill. 417 (1871).
33. Note, supra note 18, at 1908 (citing Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. Soc.
Sci. 69, 80, 82 (1880)).
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wished to use libel law to compensate aggrieved plaintiffs could not do so if
the accuracy of the publication was beyond question. This limitation be-
came increasingly troublesome in cases of new invasions of privacy that
arose from late nineteenth century technological innovations. For example,
the advent of instant photography greatly increased the press' ability to in-
vade privacy. By taking candid photographs without the subject's knowl-
edge or consent, and printing these pictures in newspapers, members of the
press found a new way to invade privacy without libelling the subject.34
Consequently, even the most expanded application of the principles of libel
law provided inadequate protection.
The increasing number of invasions of privacy by the press and
"[w]idespread public dissatisfaction with the lack of effective legal recourse
led to many demands for improved remedies."" In many cases, whether
involving the press or not, individuals were not willing to wait for legal rem-
edies and, instead, redressed invasions in their own ways. "The principal
means of protecting privacy.., was the willingness of nineteenth century
Americans to resort to force-quite often deadly force-in the defense of
their homes."36 According to a popular opinion expressed during the same
year that Warren and Brandeis published their article, "[a]ny citizen has a
right to defend his privacy to whatever extent he may find necessary, save
against recognized and accredited officers of the law with the official order of
the community in the shape of a warrant to justify their intrusion." '37 Unfor-
tunately, the mere fact that individuals found it necessary to use deadly force
to defend their privacy strongly underscored the inadequacy of existing legal
protection and created a compelling need for new legal theories designed to
afford such protection.3
34. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 172 (1967).
35. Note, supra note 18, at 1909 (citing, inter alia, Bascom, Public Press and Personal
Rights, 4 EDuc. 604, 604-05 (1884) ("new defenses should be set up in behalf of the individ-
ual" against "the omnipresent press"); Field, The Newspaper Press and the Law of Libel, 3
INT'L REV. 479, 484-86 (1876); Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. Soc. Sci. 69, 80, 82
(1880)).
36. Note, supra note 18, at 1898.
37. Id. at 1898 & n.48 (quoting A Man's House His Castle, 9 Pun. OPINION 342 (1890)
(expressing the view that individuals have a "perfect right" to use deadly force where privacy
is threatened)).
38. While nineteenth century courts seldom spoke in terms of protecting an individual's
privacy, one rare case actually awarded damages on the ground that the defendants invaded
the plaintiff's "right to privacy." In De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881), the
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed an award of damages against a physician who needlessly
brought an untrained, unmarried assistant into the plaintiff's bedroom to observe her child-
birth. Id. at 166, 9 N.W. at 146. Reasoning that childbirth is a "sacred" occasion, the Court
held that "[t]he plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such a time, and
the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its
[Vol. 39:703
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II. WARREN AND BRANDEIS' APPROACH TO PRIVACY LAW
Like the public at large, Warren and Brandeis were dissatisfied with the
lack of effective legal remedies available to those who found their privacy
invaded, particularly those victimized by an overzealous and increasingly
invasive press. Unlike many members of the public, however, Warren and
Brandeis did not resort to force to redress such invasions; they used a far
more potent weapon-the law review article.
39
According to Dean William Prosser, Warren's personal dissatisfaction
with abusive journalistic tactics prompted this "outstanding example of the
influence of legal periodicals upon the American law."'  As members of
Boston's social elite, Warren and his family frequently had to contend with
gossip columns that reported the affairs and social events of prominent citi-
zens in "highly personal and embarrassing detail."41 "The matter came to a
head when the newspapers had a field day on the occasion of the wedding of
a daughter, and Mr. Warren became annoyed." '42 Observing that "the press,
the advertisers and the entertainment industry of America were to pay
dearly" for this annoyance,43 Dean Prosser glibly remarked that Warren's
newlywed daughter had a "face that launched a thousand lawsuits.""
Though this legend has recently been discredited,45 and no one is quite
sure what inspired Warren and Brandeis to write their article," Warren and
Brandeis' dissatisfaction with abusive press tactics, expanded gossip col-
umns, and the "yellow journalism" of the late 1800's was readily apparent.47
violation." Id. at 165-66, 9 N.W. at 149. Despite the novelty of this holding, the De May case
received little attention when decided and had no impact in establishing a general right to
privacy.
39. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
40. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 383 (1960).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing A. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946)); see also Kalven,
supra note 7, at 329 n.22 ("It is now well known that the impetus for the article came from
Warren's irritation over the way the press covered the wedding of his daughter in 1890.").
43. Prosser, supra note 40, at 383.
44. Id at 423.
45. Relying on a genealogical study of the Warren family and other published records,
James Barron has determined that Warren's first daughter was not born until April 9, 1884.
Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying
a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 875, 893 (1979). "Even assuming that Mrs.
Warren was pregnant at the time of the wedding ceremony, the girl would have been no more
than seven-years old when Warren and Brandeis wrote the article." Id (footnote omitted).
46. Id at 921. After discussing several theories on what prompted Warren and Brandeis
to write their article, Barron was unable to "demystify" completely this landmark citation,
concluding that there is "no clearcut answer" to questions regarding the genesis of this article.
Id.
47. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
1990]
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In one of the most scathing indictments of the press ever written, Warren
and Brandeis vented their frustration with members of the fourth estate:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of
the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion
upon the domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life, at-
tendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some
retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude
and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."
By referring to "modem enterprise and invention," Warren and Brandeis
blamed this disturbing trend on late nineteenth century technological ad-
vances that were beginning to foster more intrusive press tactics at the ex-
pense of individual privacy.49 Specifically, Warren and Brandeis observed
thai "[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' "50 To confront this threat,
these authors proposed that the common law expand to meet the growing
needs of society and afford individuals what Judge Thomas Cooley dubbed a
right "to be let alone."5
In advocating a right to be let alone, or a "right to privacy," Warren and
Brandeis relied primarily on English precedents to demonstrate that courts
have long protected privacy under the guise of seemingly remote legal theo-
ries. These theories were based upon the laws of intellectual property and of
contract.
48. Id at 196.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 195.
51. Id. Judge Cooley first used this phrase in his popular treatise on tort law. See T.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). Ironically, while his termi-
nology has become synonymous with a right to privacy, Judge Cooley used this term to en-
compass the individual's right to be free from physical attack. Id. at 24, 29 (discussing "the
right to immunity from attacks and injuries").
[Vol. 39:703
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According to Warren and Brandeis, English common law copyright cases
were "but instances and applications of a general right to privacy, which
properly understood afford a remedy for the evils under consideration.
' '52
Unlike statutory copyright provisions, designed to compensate authors for
economic losses caused by the unauthorized copying of their published
works, the common law provided authors with the right to keep their works
private; that is, to refrain from publishing altogether.5 3 Because common
law copyright protection did not depend upon the value of the work, or even
upon the particular medium in which the author's thoughts were expressed,
Warren and Brandeis questioned whether this protection truly constituted a
tangible property right.54 "The principle which protects personal writings
and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropria-
tion, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of
private property, but that of an inviolate personality." 55
Warren and Brandeis derived support for this conclusion from Prince Al-
bert v. Strange. 56 In this case, Prince Albert sought to enjoin Strange from
exhibiting unpublished etchings produced by himself and Queen Victoria.
These royal plaintiffs made these etchings for their own pleasure, and while
they had given individual copies to friends, Prince Albert and Queen Victo-
ria had no intention of publishing them.57 After obtaining copies without
authorization, Strange not only planned to feature the etchings in a public
exhibition, he also planned to publish a catalogue describing each work in
detail. 58
Although copyright law typically protects only the expression of an artist's
or author's ideas (i.e., the etchings themselves) and not the facts or ideas
expressed (i.e., a factual description of the etchings), 9 the Vice-Chancellor
52. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
53. Under common law copyright, an author has absolute control over the "act of publi-
cation, and in the exercise of his own discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publica-
tion at all. The statutory right is of no value, unless there is a publication; the common-law
right is lost as soon as there is a publication." Id. at 200 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
54. Id at 205 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. (footnote omitted).
56. 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1848)(V.C.), aff'd, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng.
Rep. 1171 (1848)(Ch.).
57. According to the complaint, Prince Albert and Queen Victoria made these etchings
"for their amusement .... being principally subjects of private and domestic interest to them-
selves, and of which etchings they had made impressions for their own use, and not for publi-
cation." Id at 652, 64 Eng. Rep. at 293.
58. Id at 653-54, 64 Eng. Rep. at 294.
59. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D], at 2-34 (1989); A. LATMAN, R.
GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 30 (1989) ("A copyright extends
neither to systems explained in a work, nor to discrete facts contained within a work."). This
1990]
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did not heed this limitation. Instead, he held that "the common-law rule
prohibited not merely the reproduction of the etchings .. .but also 'the
publishing .... though not by copy or resemblance, a description of them,
whether more or less limited or summary, whether in the form of a catalogue
or otherwise.' "I Because the court protected the artists' thoughts and sen-
timents, independent of the tangible expression of these ideas, Warren and
Brandeis read between the lines of this opinion and concluded that the court
had protected much more than their intellectual property-it had protected
the privacy of the artists' innermost thoughts.61
In Warren and Brandeis' opinion, copyright law was not the only tool that
courts used to protect privacy. Frequently, courts redressed invasions of pri-
vacy by implying terms in a contract and finding a breach of trust.62 Thus,
in affirming the Vice-Chancellor's decision in Prince Albert v. Strange,63 the
appellate court stated that an injunction prohibiting exhibition of the royal
etchings was not only justified under common law copyright,6 but was also
appropriate considering that Strange had acquired these etchings through an
apparent breach of trust by one of the plaintiffs' employees.65
The English courts took a similar approach in Abernethy v. Hutchinson,66
a case that Warren and Brandeis cited prominently. In Abernethy, a well
distinction is commonly referred to as the "idea/expression" or "fact/expression" dichotomy
of copyright law. Id.
60. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 202 (quoting Prince Albert, 2 De.G. & Sm. at
697, 64 Eng. Rep. at 312).
61. Id. at 204-05. Consistent with Warren and Brandeis' interpretation, the Vice-Chan-
cellor certainly appeared to have privacy on his mind in rendering this decision:
I think.., not only that the Defendant here is unlawfully invading the Plaintiff's
right, but also that the invasion is of such a kind and affects such property as to
entitle the Plaintiff to the preventive remedy of an injunction; and if not the more, yet
certainly not the less, because it is an intrusion--an unbecoming and unseemly intru-
sion-an intrusion not alone in breach of conventional rules, but offensive to that
inbred sense of propriety natural to every man-if intrusion, indeed, fitly describes a
sordid spying into the privacy of domestic hfe-into the home (a word hitherto sacred
among us), the home of a family whose life and conduct form an acknowledged title,
though not their only unquestionable title, to the most marked respect in this
country.
Prince Albert, 2 De G. & Sm. at 698, 64 Eng. Rep. at 313 (emphasis added). Critics of Warren
and Brandeis suggest that these authors were mistaken to rely on Prince Albert as that case
may represent a rare departure from the limitations of copyright law in order to maintain the
privacy of the Royal Family. See, e.g., Pratt, The Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right
to Privacy, 1975 Pun. L. 161, 166 (Prince Albert "was somewhat of an aberration from other
cases because of the involvement of the Royal Family.").
62. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 207-10.
63. 1 Mac. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849)(Ch.).
64. Id. at 42-44, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1178.
65. Id. at 44-45, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1178-79.
66. 1 H. & Tw. 28, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (1825).
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known surgeon sought to enjoin his medical students from publishing a se-
ries of lectures delivered in his classroom.67 Because the surgeon delivered
these lectures orally and had not committed them to writing,68 the court
refused to enjoin the students' planned publication on the basis of copyright
law.69 Despite the apparent unavailability of copyright remedies, the court
nonetheless granted the injunction on the ground that the students had
breached an implied confidence to their teacher.7° In the court's view, these
students had permission to attend the plaintiff's lectures "only for the pur-
poses of their own information, and could not publish for profit that which
they had not obtained the right of selling.",
71
Similarly, in Pollard v. Photographic Co., 72 the court enjoined a photogra-
pher from publishing the picture of a woman who agreed to have her photo-
graph taken, but did not agree to have it published. Though deciding
partially on intellectual property grounds, the court held that such a publica-
tion would breach an implied contract between the photographer and his
subject not to publish the picture without the subject's consent.73
After reviewing these cases, and the manner in which English courts ex-
tended copyright law and implied contracts to protect privacy, Warren and
Brandeis observed that this legal fiction was "nothing more nor less than a
judicial declaration that public morality, private justice, and general conven-
ience demand the recognition of such a rule, and that the publication under
similar circumstances would be considered an intolerable abuse."'74 While
Warren and Brandeis read each decision as implicitly resting on privacy
grounds, they feared that if courts continued to resort to legal fictions they
would be unable to protect privacy adequately in light of modem technol-
ogy. Illustrating this fear, these authors emphasized that the new age of
candid photography enabled total strangers to invade privacy surreptitiously
under circumstances in which courts could not apply copyright law, or im-
67. Id. at 28-33, 47 Eng. Rep. at 1313-15.
68. Id at 29, 47 Eng. Rep. at 1313.
69. Id. at 40-41, 47 Eng. Rep. at 1318.
70. Id at 39-41, 47 Eng. Rep. at 1317-18.
71. Id at 40, 47 Eng. Rep. at 1317.
72. 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888).
73. Id. at 353. Warren and Brandeis also discussed the case of Tuck v. Priester, 19 Q.B.D.
639 (1887), where the court held a printer liable for breaching an implied contract by making
and selling unauthorized reproductions of a picture that a customer left for copying. Warren
& Brandeis, supra note 1, at 208.
74. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 210. These authors cited additional examples of
such judicial manipulation from cases protecting property in the contents of letters and en-
joining the publication of trade secrets. Id. at 211-12.
1990]
Catholic University Law Review
ply a term in a contract, to find a breach of contract or trust.7 5 For this
reason, Warren and Brandeis urged courts to discard such legal fictions and
to protect privacy directly by providing tort remedies for its unwarranted
invasion.76
Warren and Brandeis did not believe that providing the necessary protec-
tion required courts to resort to "judicial legislation."' 77 Rather, they main-
tained that courts need only apply the same privacy principles that they had
long recognized under the guise of alternate theories and legal fictions.78
"The principle which protects personal writings and any other productions
of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no
new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the personal
appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.",
79
While advocating both monetary and injunctive relief for violations of the
right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis did not regard this right as absolute.8"
Wishing to minimize intrusions on freedom of the press, these commentators
proposed four limitations on the right to privacy:
1. The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of
matter which is of public or general interest.
2. The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of
any matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is
made under circumstances which would render it a privileged com-
munication according to the law of slander and libel.
75. In these cases, where no relationships are formed between photographers and their
subjects, Warren and Brandeis acknowledged the uselessness of implied contract theories:
While, for instance, the state of the photographic art was such that one's picture
could seldom be taken without consciously "sitting" for the purpose, the law of con-
tract or of trust might afford the prudent man sufficient safeguards against the im-
proper circulation of his portrait; but since the latest advances in photographic art
have rendered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract
and of trust are inadequate to support the required protection ....
Id. at 211.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 213 n.l.
78. Id. at 213.
79. Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 219. Warren and Brandeis proposed that unwarranted invasions of privacy be
compensated with damages "in all cases" and that injunctive relief be made available in "a
very limited class of cases." Id (footnotes omitted). They also suggested that criminal penal-
ties be imposed, but acknowledged that legislators must enact appropriate legislation for this
purpose. Id.
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3. The law would probably not grant any redress for the inva-
sion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special
damage.
4. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts
by the individual, or with his consent.8"
By limiting the right in this manner, Warren and Brandeis hoped to protect
an individual's privacy while safeguarding legitimate interests in the infor-
mation at issue and in a free press. Presumably, Warren and Brandeis also
hoped to improve the chances that the right to privacy would be recognized
by courts who might otherwise be concerned that the commentators' propos-
als went a bit too far.
III. WARREN AND BRANDEIS' IMPACT - A PRIVACY LAW
REVOLUTION
While a few courts initially accepted Warren and Brandeis' ideas and en-
tertained actions for invasions of privacy, 2 the first major case to address
their proposals did so in a manner that undoubtedly disappointed both men.
In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 3 the New York Court of Appeals
considered the claims of a woman whose privacy was allegedly invaded
when defendants used her portrait without her consent to advertise flour.
The plaintiff asserted the ideas of Warren and Brandeis as a basis for recov-
ery. 4 In rejecting her claims, the Roberson majority severely criticized War-
81. Id. at 214, 216-18. In an effort to distinguish their tort from actions based on libel
law, Warren and Brandeis stressed that traditional libel defenses would not apply where the
press violates the right to privacy. Accordingly, the publisher of private facts cannot assert
either the truth of the matter disclosed or the absence of malice in defending against privacy
claims. Id.
82. See, eg., Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (holding that a
public figure, unlike a private individual, may not prohibit the publication of his portrait);
Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (enjoining defendant
from the unauthorized use of a physician's signature, or copy thereof, in advertising a
medicine); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Super. Ct. N.Y. City 1893) ("The action
may seem novel, but there can be no question about the plaintiff's right to relief .... ). One
early court, however, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co.,
121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899), sharply criticized the Warren and Brandeis article and
concluded that "authoritative decisions which support the theory advocated are wanting." Id
at 375, 80 N.W. at 286. Although that court took pains to "sympathize" with the plaintiff, it
rejected the plaintiff's privacy claim on the ground that "it is one of the ills that, under the
law, cannot be redressed." Id. at 384, 80 N.W. at 289.
83. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
84. Id at 544, 64 N.E. at 443 (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1).
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ren and Brandeis' article and warned that the right advocated in this
manuscript would invite "litigation bordering upon the absurd." 5
Rather than heeding Warren and Brandeis' call for courts to provide new
remedies for invasions of privacy, the Roberson court refused to depart from
traditional doctrine. After reviewing the cases cited by Warren and Bran-
deis, the court found their interpretations and arguments to be utterly lack-
ing in precedent.8 6 The court concluded that "the so-called 'right of privacy'
has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view
it, the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled
principles of law by which the profession and the public have long been
guided.""7 According to the Roberson majority, a right to privacy would
also do violence to the judicial system by plaguing courts with an explosion
of ludicrous lawsuits:
If such a principle be incorporated into the body of the law
through the instrumentality of a court of equity, the attempts to
logically apply the principle will necessarily result not only in a
vast amount of litigation, but in litigation bordering upon the ab-
surd, for the right of privacy, once established as a legal doctrine,
cannot be confined to the restraint of the publication of a likeness,
but must necessarily embrace as well the publication of a word pic-
ture, a comment upon one's looks, conduct, domestic relations or
habits. And, were the right of privacy once legally asserted, it
would necessarily be held to include the same things if spoken in-
stead of printed, for one, as well as the other, invades the right to
be absolutely let alone.88
Without appearing to encourage it, the court suggested that this right could
only be established through legislation specifically prohibiting invasions of
privacy.89 "In such event no embarrassment would result to the general
body of the law, for the rule would be applicable only to cases provided for
by the statute."'
85. Id at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
86. Id. at 543, 64 N.E. at 443.
87. Id. at 546, 64 N.E. at 447.
88. Id at 544-45, 64 N.E. at 443.
89. Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
90. Id.
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Reacting to a storm of public protest over this decision,91 the New York
Legislature passed two such statutes the following year.92 These statutes,
which remain on the books in amended form,93 made it both a tort and a
misdemeanor for any person, firm, or corporation to use another's name,
portrait, or picture for commercial purposes without the subject's consent.94
While these provisions are frequently invoked to protect individual privacy,
"[t]he right of privacy under the New York Statute is more restricted than
that right in states where it has been recognized without legislation." 95
Three years after Roberson, the Supreme Court of Georgia became the
first high court to recognize a common law right of privacy when it refused
to follow the New York Court of Appeals and unanimously endorsed the
views of Warren and Brandeis.96 In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,97
91. Not surprisingly, the Roberson court's refusal to depart from existing law did not meet
with the approval of a public that hungered for increased privacy protection. Ironically, one of
the most scathing attacks on this decision was waged by a member of the press and published
in the New York Time& Shortly after the court released its opinion, the New York Times sent
out the following call for legislative action:
[The highest legal authority in the greatest State in the Union assures us that (inva-
sions of privacy] are outrages for which the law provides no remedy. So much the
worse for the law, say all the decent people. If there be... no law now to cover these
savage and horrible practices, practices incompatible with the claims of the commu-
nity in which they are allowed to be committed with impunity to be called a civilized
community, then the decent people will say that it is high time that there were such a
law... and the Court of Appeals will not be left to shadowy analogies and prece-
dents for its conclusion that these outrages are legally unpreventable and unpunish-
able. It will have the advantage of a clear and explicit statute to construe.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8, col. 3. This editorial prompted a member of the Roberson
majority, Judge Denis O'Brien, to take the unprecedented step of defending his decision in a
law review article. See O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1902). In that
article, Judge O'Brien defended the court's decision to adhere to established precedent rather
than "embark[ing] in the business of making new law to suit a particular case .... It is easy
enough to wander away from beaten paths that are safe, but it is not always so easy to return."
Id. at 448. Judge O'Brien also urged the New York Legislature to refrain from making new
law in this area. According to Judge O'Brien, "The right of privacy, so called, represents an
attractive idea to the moralist and social reformer, but to the lawmaker, who seeks to embody
the right in a statute, the subject is surrounded with some serious difficulties." Id. at 445.
92. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2. The New York Court of Appeals held these statutes
constitutional in Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908),
aff'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911).
93. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1990).
94. Id.
95. Manger v. Kree Institute of Electrolysis, Inc., 233 F.2d 5, 8 n.3a (2d Cir. 1956) (citing
Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 538-39 (1941)). According to some com-
mentators, however, this restriction has not posed a practical problem for most plaintiffs and,
in most cases, the rights provided by the New York statutes are "quite consistent with the
common law as it has been worked out in other states." Prosser, supra note 40, at 385-86.
96. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
97. Id.
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the court ruled in favor of a plaintiff who claimed that the defendant insur-
ance company violated his right to privacy when it used his name, portrait,
and a fictitious testimonial in its newspaper advertisement without his
consent.98
Unlike the Roberson majority, the lack of precedent underlying the right
to privacy did not disturb the Pavesich court. The court was far more un-
comfortable with the traditional practices of judges whose unwavering reli-
ance on precedent prevented them from formulating new legal remedies for
new situations.99 In fact, the court sharply criticized the Roberson decision
as "the result of an unconscious yielding to the feeling of conservatism
which naturally arises in the mind of a judge who faces a proposition which
is novel."' 1 In the Pavesich court's view, "this conservatism should not go
to the extent of refusing to recognize a right which the instincts of nature
prove to exist, and, which nothing in judicial decision, legal history, or writ-
ings upon the law can be called to demonstrate its nonexistence as a legal
right."'' Accordingly, the court recognized a right to privacy "derived
from natural law"' 2 and boldly predicted that such a right would become
firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence:
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within
proper limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy, and that the
publication of one's picture without his consent by another as an
advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits and
gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that we venture
to predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel
that a contrary view was even entertained by judges of eminence
and ability .... 3
The popularity of the Pavesich decision helped to establish this prediction
as a self-fulfilling prophecy. By 1939, so many courts had followed
Pavesich's lead that the American Law Institute codified the right of privacy
in the Restatement of Torts. " The Restatement provided that "[a] person
who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not hav-
ing his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable
to the other."' 05 As more courts entertained privacy suits, the right of pri-
98. Id. at 192, 213-16, 50 S.E. at 69, 78-79.
99. Id. at 211-13, 50 S.E. at 77-78.
100. Id at 213, 50 S.E. at 78.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 197, 50 S.E. at 70.
103. Id. at 220, 50 S.E. at 80-81.
104. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
105. Id. Comment d to this provision emphasizes that "liability exists only if the defend-
ant's conduct was such that he should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of
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vacy evolved into four separate torts that the American Law Institute added
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1977: (1) "unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another"; (2) "appropriation of the other's name or
likeness"; (3) "unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life"; and
(4) "publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public."'" °  Today, most courts recognize all four of these torts,10 7 and as
the Pavesich court predicted, the right to privacy has earned a prominent
place in American jurisprudence.1s
Though this right to privacy has become "plainly rooted in the traditions
and significant concerns of our society,"" 9 its importance continues to grow.
With the continuing development of what Warren and Brandeis called
"modern enterprise and invention,"' 0 the continuing expansion of privacy
rights may be more important than ever. Indeed, computer age technology
threatens privacy in ways that Warren and Brandeis could not possibly have
imagined. Far more than the newspaper gossip trade that concerned these
authors, these innovations have created an "information economy," in
which entire industries are founded upon the compilation, purchase, and sale
of personal information."' "For example, modern information gathering
ordinary sensibilities." The drafters of this provision specifically listed the facts in Roberson as
an example of such conduct. Id. comment d, Illustration 4.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
107. Comment, Intrusions Upon Informational Seclusion in the Computer Age, 17 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 831, 835 (1984) (the four torts are "generally accepted by the courts"). After
Pavesich, "virtually every state, by either judicial decision or statute, has created protection for
the right to privacy." Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Per-
sonal Information, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1395, 1405 (1987) (footnote omitted).
108. While the United States Supreme Court has recognized privacy rights of a constitu-
tional magnitude in a variety of contexts, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973)
(recognizing control over one's body as a privacy right); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) (protecting the sanctity of a home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(protecting privacy in marital relationship), the circuit courts are split over whether a broad
constitutional right to informational privacy exists. Compare Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172
(5th Cir. 1981) (constitutional right to privacy exists), United States v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (same), and Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.
1978) (same), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) with J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir.
1981) (Supreme Court has not recognized constitutional right to informational privacy). De-
spite this disagreement, the Supreme Court's recent treatment of the conflict between privacy
rights and the first amendment strongly suggests that a general right to informational privacy
has yet to attain constitutional status. Kramer, The Full-Court Press: Sacrificing Vital Privacy
Interests on the Altar of First Amendment Rhetoric, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 117
n.22 (1989).
109. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
110. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
111. Lautsch, Computers, Communications and the Wealth of Nations: Some Theoretical
and Policy Considerations About an Information Economy, 4 COMPUTER/LAw J. 101, 101-02
(1983).
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and retrieval techniques enable organizations to build up not only files, but
mosaics of, persons' characteristics, derived from records of purchases, relo-
cations, tax information, and so on."
' 1 2
Unlike the gossip columns of the late 1800's, this information is not dis-
carded with the daily paper. Rather, it is stored in insatiable electronic
databanks where it may be retrieved years later at the press of a button. As
a result, many individuals become trapped in an "information prison."1" 3
Unable to escape the damaging consequences of their own personal history,
these individuals may never recapture the privacy destroyed by the unforgiv-
ing memory of the computer.' 
1 4
Because this technology has grown with incredible speed,1 privacy law
has had difficulty keeping pace with these changes, and many commentators
have complained that the law no longer provides adequate protection against
the intrusions of the Computer Age.116 Echoing the words of Warren and
Brandeis, these modem-day privacy proponents once again call for courts to
expand the law to meet new threats to privacy posed by technological inno-
vations. "Just as the genesis of the privacy tort was in technological and
social changes in the last years of the nineteenth century, so too in the last
years of the twentieth century should we recognize that further changes ne-
cessitate expansion of the law."
'' 17
112. Id. at 116. Our computerized economy has also aroused the concern of Professor
Arthur Miller who observed that
each time a citizen files a tax return, applies for life insurance or a credit card, seeks
government benefits, or interviews for a job, a dossier is opened under his name and
his informational profile is sketched. It has now reached the point at which when-
ever we travel on a commercial airline, reserve a room at one of the national hotel
chains, or rent a car we are likely to leave distinctive electronic tracks in the memory
of a computer-tracks that can tell a great deal about our activities, habits, and as-
sociations when collected and analyzed.
Miller, The Dossier Society, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 154, 155.
113. Solomon, Personal Privacy and the "1984" Syndrome, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 753,
755 (1985).
114. Id. ("People tend to forget and forgive, computers do not.").
115. Comment, supra note 107, at 836 n.39.
116. See, e.g., Lautsch, supra note 111, at 119; Note, supra note 107, at 1396 ("Privacy law
has failed to respond, as it has in the past, to technological changes that influence the degree of
privacy to which we are accustomed."). Because many of the intrusions of computer technol-
ogy involve the private transfer of personal information, existing remedies designed to redress
the public disclosure of this information have not been effective in deterring such invasions.
"Were Warren and Brandeis writing today they surely would be distressed at the courts' reluc-
tance to recognize that an individual has an interest in preventing the dissemination of per-
sonal information to anonymous entities that make important decisions about that individual."
Id. at 1418.
117. Note, supra note 107, at 1418.
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In this respect, many of Warren and Brandeis' words remain as vital to-
day as when they first published their article in 1890. To quote these com-
mentators, "numerous mechanical [and electronic] devices [still] threaten to
make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be pro-
claimed from the house-tops.' "" As this technology expands, twentieth
century commentators confront this threat by repeating Warren and Bran-
deis' call for courts to expand the common law by providing increased pro-
tection for privacy. Consequently, even after a century of rapid
development, the law of privacy stands as a prime example of the adage that
"the more things change, the more they stay the same."
IV. WARREN AND BRANDEIS CRITICIZED
Although the Warren and Brandeis article remains a cause c6libre for
privacy proponents, its widespread acceptance has not pleased everyone. As
one commentator stated, many of Warren and Brandeis' proposals "have
become locked in molded phrases and have never undergone the scrutiny of
the doubting scholar." 9 In recent years, however, many doubting scholars
have emerged to scrutinize all aspects of this celebrated article.
One of the earliest and most prominent of these scholars, Professor Harry
Kalven, believed that Warren and Brandeis were simply wrong to advocate a
tort remedy for the public disclosure of private facts. 2 ' In his view, the lure
of "the great Brandeis trade mark, excitement over the law at a point of
growth, and appreciation of privacy as a key value have combined to dull the
normal critical sense of judges and commentators and have caused them not
to see the pettiness of the tort they have sponsored."'' Professor Kalven
also charged that the Warren and Brandeis "article reads ... much like a
118. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
119. D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE
FIrST AMENDMENT 33 (1972).
120. Kalven, supra note 7, at 327. While Dean Prosser divided the right of privacy into
four distinct torts which were added to the Second Restatement, Prosser, supra note 40, at 389;
see supra note 99 and accompanying text, commentators generally agree that Warren and
Brandeis were primarily concerned with the tort of public disclosure of private facts. Blous-
tein, supra note 8, at 611; Kalven, supra note 6, at 333.
121. Kalven, supra note 7, at 328 (footnote omitted). Before Professor Kalven, the only
commentator to challenge publicly Warren and Brandeis was Professor Frederick Davis. Pro-
fessor Davis argued "that the concept of a right of privacy was never required in the first place,
and that its whole history is an illustration of how well-meaning but impatient academicians
can upset the normal development of the law by pushing it too hard." Davis, Wat Do We
Mean By "Right to PF'vacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REv. 1, 23 (1959).
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brief and rests on an incomplete argument" relying upon the wrong prece-
dent and stretching it beyond its logical scope.' 22
While Professor Kalven credited Warren and Brandeis with lending their
tort "class," he sharply criticized them for failing to lend it a "legal pro-
file." 12 3 In particular, Warren and Brandeis made no effort to identify the
prima facie elements of the tort, gave no guidance for measuring damages,
and failed to articulate the degree of fault, if any, required to hold defend-
ants liable.' 24 Not only has the lack of a legal profile left courts with little
concrete guidance in deciding invasion of privacy cases, Professor Kalven
complained that the resulting ambiguities have also encouraged plaintiffs to
file trivial nuisance suits designed to extort lucrative settlements. 125 By con-
trast, individuals truly harmed by invasions of privacy would rarely, if ever,
subject themselves to the invasive and embarrassing publicity that often sur-
rounds litigation.126 Consequently, Professor Kalven concluded that "the
achievement of the new tort remedy has been primarily to breed nuisance
claims" and that Warren and Brandeis' remedy has given little practical pro-
tection to real victims of privacy invasions.' 27
Yet, Warren and Brandeis' critics generally agree that the greatest short-
coming of this remedy involves its apparent conflict with another important
protection-freedom of the press. By allowing individuals to recover against
members of the press for disclosing true statements of fact, the right to pri-
vacy may impinge on the press' first amendment right to print such state-
ments. This is particularly true when the press reports newsworthy facts of
legitimate public interest.
122. Kalven, supra note 7, at 329-30. Another critic who examined their use of precedent
boldly proclaimed "that Warren and Brandeis were wrong and that their argument was not
supported by their own evidence." Pratt, supra note 61, at 162.
123. Kalven, supra note 7, at 328, 333.
124. Id. at 333-35.
125. Id. at 337-39. "The lack of legal profile for the tort makes any sort of unconsented-to
reference to the plaintiff look colorable, and there is the threat of indeterminate damages" that
provides a great incentive for those wishing to file nuisance suits. Id at 339.
126. Id. at 338. In Professor Kalven's words, "the victims on whose behalf the privacy tort
remedy was designed will not in the real world elect to use it and ... those who will come
forward with privacy claims will very often have shabby, unseemly grievances and an interest
in exploitation." Id. One of the first commentaries ever written about the Warren and Bran-
deis article predicted the reluctance of individuals to sue for legitimate invasions of privacy:
[T]he man who feels outraged by publicity will, in order to stop or punish it, have to
expose himself to a great deal more publicity. In order to bring his persecutors to
justice, he will have to go through a process which will result in an exposure of his
private affairs tenfold greater than that originally made by the offending article.
Godkin, The Right to Privacy, 51 THE NATION 496 (1890).
127. Kalven, supra note 7, at 339. For a thoughtful response to Professor Kalven, see
Bloustein, supra note 8.
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While Warren and Brandeis recognized this problem and emphasized that
the "right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of
public or general interest,"12 their critics have defined the "public interest"
so broadly that this newsworthiness exception may literally swallow the rule.
Adopting "the simple contention that whatever is in the news media is by
definition newsworthy,"12 9 Professor Kalven questioned whether the press'
"claim of privilege is not so overpowering as virtually to swallow the
tort."1
30
Another prominent commentator answered this question in favor of the
press in a sharp critique that advocated the total elimination of this tort.1
3 1
According to Professor Diane Zimmerman, proponents of Warren and
Brandeis' privacy tort "have often underplayed its serious constitutional
problems and have overlooked the fact that genuine social values are served
by encouraging a free exchange of personal information.', 132 After examin-
ing what she believes are insurmountable constitutional problems, Professor
Zimmerman could not reconcile Warren and Brandeis' views with existing
first amendment rights and urged courts to abandon the tort of invasion of
privacy: "[A]fter nearly a century of experience, . .. it is probably time to
admit defeat, give up the efforts at resuscitation, and lay the noble experi-
ment in the instant creation of common law to a well-deserved rest."'
133
128. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
129. Kalven, supra note 7, at 336.
130. Id
131. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Pri-
vacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).
132. Id at 294.
133. Id at 365. A recent line of Supreme Court cases has led some observers to conclude
that the Court may indeed be laying Warren and Brandeis' privacy tort to rest. In the last
fifteen years, the Court has repeatedly afforded the press a first amendment privilege to publish
private facts without regard for the vital privacy interests sacrificed in the process. See, e.g.,
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (rape victim's name disclosed); Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (juvenile delinquent's name published); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (confidential investigation of judge
revealed); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (juvenile delin-
quent's name published); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (rape victim's
name broadcast). The Court's seeming disregard for plaintiffs' privacy has led one dissenting
justice to conclude that his brethren have accepted an "invitation... to obliterate one of the
most note-worthy legal inventions of the 20th-Century: the tort of the publication of private
facts." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2618 (White, J., dissenting) (citing W. PROSSER, J. WADE &
V. SCHWARTZ, TORTs 951-52 (8th ed. 1988)). Despite this solemn appraisal, the Court has yet
to announce the elimination of this tort and, considering its remarkable stamina over the last
century, rumors of its demise may be greatly exaggerated. For an article criticizing the Court's
resolutions of conflicts between privacy and the press, see Kramer, supra note 108.
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V. CONCLUSION
As privacy law celebrates its one hundredth birthday, this fascinating field
shows few signs of aging. Although certain critics would give it a "well-
deserved rest," the field of privacy law remains as fresh and dynamic after
one century as the technological innovations that have sparked its continu-
ing development. While privacy protections continue to evolve, the right
first advocated by Warren and Brandeis has earned a prominent place in
American jurisprudence and is now regarded as one of society's most funda-
mental values.
Privacy law also occupies a prominent place in legal scholarship and con-
tinues to provoke thoughtful commentary and sharp criticism from many of
the foremost legal minds of our time. 1 34 Many of these commentators have
joined Warren and Brandeis in promoting the right to privacy. As Dean
Prosser aptly observed in his famous treatise on tort law, "no other tort has
received such an outpouring of comment in advocacy of its bare exist-
ence." ' " Although not all commentators are persuaded by Warren and
Brandeis' proposals, and some have seriously questioned their validity,
1 36
few scholars can help but admire the incredible impact of two young lawyers
who, in a single law review article published a century ago, created an entire
field of law that may continue to intrigue courts and commentators for cen-
turies to come.
134. See, e.g., Miller, Press Versus Privacy, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 843 (1981); Emerson, The
Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (1979); E. BLOUS-
TEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY (1978); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Prosser, supra note 40.
135. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 850 (5th ed. 1984).
136. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
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